China Naming Network - Weather knowledge - Our army suffered a great loss in this war. Not only did it not annihilate the enemy, but two columns were also surrounded by the enemy.

Our army suffered a great loss in this war. Not only did it not annihilate the enemy, but two columns were also surrounded by the enemy.

in March, 1947, the Kuomintang army headed by Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 45, troops from 24 reorganized divisions to launch a key attack on the liberated areas in Shandong. In this battle, the Kuomintang army concentrated its elite forces, taking Yan 'an and Shandong liberated areas as the two main attack directions. Facing the attack of the enemy's superior forces, our East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army cooperated, and the main force was constantly transferred, and the outstanding enemy forces were wiped out in Tai 'an.

naturally, the enemies who become angry from embarrassment will take revenge, but our army is also very clear that we can't confront the enemy head-on in any case. After all, the strength of the two sides is too great. Therefore, until July, our army has been in a campaign to constantly annihilate the enemy's effective forces. The Kuomintang army has also changed its original strategy of attacking the east and defending the west. Instead, it deployed seven reorganized divisions and two armies in central Shandong to attack southern Shandong, while four reorganized units were reserved in central Shandong.

Aware of the enemy's strategic gap, our army is determined to return to the central Shandong area to annihilate the enemy's four reorganization divisions. You should know that these four reorganization divisions are unusual. Among them, the 11th reorganization division of Hu Lian is stationed in Nanma, and the 25th reorganization division of Huang Botao is stationed in Donglidian. These two units are both very effective. In addition, there are the 64th reorganization division, the 9th reorganization division stationed in Yishui and the 8th reorganization division of Li Mi stationed in Linqu. We can help each other.

Our army mobilized four columns of troops, and Huang Botao reorganized the 25th Division, which was a prominent position, so we decided to eat Huang Botao. However, due to the heavy rain and Huang Botao's astuteness, the reorganized 25th Division quickly approached the next 64th Division, so the battle could not be fought.

Later, our army discovered that the 11th Division of Hu Lian BGF was located in Nanma, and its position was more prominent, so it was determined to annihilate the 11th Division. However, Nanma was relatively high-lying, and Hu Lian was cunning. Before the war, we discovered the terrain problem of Lucun, so we built a solid fortress. Sure enough, when our four columns attacked, relying on the solid fortifications, our army failed to capture Nanma, but it suffered heavy losses.

In desperation, after our army withdrew from Nanma on July 21, 1947, we looked for an opportunity to attack the 8th BGF Division stationed in Linqu. The division commander of the 8th Division was Li Mi, who was also a general who graduated from the first phase of Huangpu. Because of the previous battle of Nanma, the 8th BGF Division was stationed in Weixian. Due to being asked to rescue Hu Lian in time, but after our army left Nanma later, Li Mi received an order to reorganize the Eighth Division and his men to be near Linqu, and time was short, so he could not build fortifications like Hu Lian.

However, the Eighth Division was actually an elite force. However, because our army had fought against it in the early stage, we didn't take it seriously. However, this mentality was put in a state of combat, but there was a big problem. In the battle of Linqu, although the Eighth Division lost more than 4, people, it was still able to firmly hold its position. Due to the delay in taking the position, the 25th Division and the 25th Division arrived one after another.

including the battles in Nanma and Linqu, although our army achieved 18, enemy body count, its own casualties also reached 21,, which can be said to be extremely disproportionate. Our army also summed up the experience and lessons after the war. On the one hand, it was careless to underestimate the enemy, and on the other hand, it failed to give correct guidance to the new soldiers, coupled with the bad weather, which greatly reduced the combat effectiveness of some troops.