Nanjing local auction lottery
Behind the "change" of the second round of land auction, it is related to the adjustment of the land transfer policy of the pilot city of centralized land supply by the recent closed meeting of the Ministry of Natural Resources. Judging from the cities that have completed the adjustment of land auction, the adjustment content focuses on the qualification examination of real estate enterprises, the source of funds, the rules of land auction and the adjustment of premium ceiling.
The new mechanism of land auction has been presented one after another, and the adjustment of several cities has confirmed the previous relevant regulations of the Ministry of Natural Resources: the upper limit of single land transfer fee shall not exceed15%; Not by raising the reserve price, competitive construction and other ways to raise the actual land price; After reaching the upper limit, the land ownership will be determined by means of lottery, one-time quotation and bidding scheme. A big trend is that local auctions in key cities will enter the era of lottery in the future.
It is worth noting that the local auction rules of competitive construction have been replaced by a more perfect system. In the future, if there is no competitive construction, plus the upper limit of premium rate of 15%, the profit margin of housing enterprises that is constantly being compressed is expected to return to a reasonable level. In terms of cities, Shenzhen and Hangzhou, which were obviously suppressed before, are worth looking forward to.
A high proportion of allocation and construction has greatly increased the actual land price.
With the end of the first round of centralized land auction in 22 key cities, some unstable factors that raise land prices in disguise have been amplified.
According to CRIC, most of the 22 cities in the first round of centralized land auction adopted the method of "limited land price+competitive construction (self-sustaining)", among which only Beijing, Hefei and Guangzhou put forward clear upper limit requirements for competitive construction. For cities with fierce competition in land auction, the proportion of competitive construction is even as high as 30%. High-level construction reduces the saleable residential area of the project, but also increases the actual land price of land transactions in disguise, and the living space of housing enterprises is squeezed.
Hot second-tier cities such as Hangzhou and Chengdu are the most typical. Most of the completed plots have reached the requirements of competitive construction, and there are not a few plots with a proportion of more than 30%. Of the 56 cases of commercial residential land sold in Hangzhou in the first round, 4 1 plot has self-sustaining requirements. For example, the self-sustaining ratio of Gongshu Xiangfu unit homestead and Lin 'an Chengdong Binhu New District unit plot all exceeds 30%.
With a high proportion of allocated or self-sustaining plots, there is a big gap between the nominal land price and the actual land price, and the profit margin of the project is obviously compressed. Take Hangzhou Gongshu Xiangfu Homestead as an example. The floor price of this parcel is 178 16 yuan/m2. The nominal land price seems to be low, but the project still has 38% self-sustaining requirements, and the actual saleable floor price is close to 29,000 yuan/m2.
CRIC further compares the nominal land price of the first round transaction in 22 cities with the actual saleable land price after considering the construction, and finds that the average value of the actual saleable board price in seven cities, namely Shenzhen, Chengdu, Hefei, Beijing, Hangzhou, Wuxi and Xiamen, is more than 10% higher than the average value of the nominal land price, among which Shenzhen ranks first with a gap of 39%. However, the average transaction price of the first round of centralized land auction in most cities exceeds the transaction price of homestead in 2020, and the actual land price increase in some cities is even higher, which is obviously contrary to the requirements of stable land price, stable house price and stable expectation.
Premium rate 15%+ no supporting construction, land lottery becomes the mainstream.
At present, in these cities that have suspended or suspended the second round of land transfer, there are already clear new rules for urban land auction. For example, for the 6 1 homestead to be sold in Tianjin, the highest premium rate is adjusted to be within 15% in addition to the strict examination of the development qualification of the bidding enterprises and the source of land purchase funds, and the winning bidder is determined by increasing the lottery.
While strictly controlling the development qualification, ownership and purchase funds, Jinan changed the transfer mode from "limited land price and winning the government reserve public houses" to "limited land price and drawing lots to determine the bidder", and set the highest price limit for residential land, with the premium rate not exceeding 15%.
Judging from the cities that have published the latest local auction rules, it basically covers the qualification of real estate development, the bidder's source of funds must have its own funds, the premium rate of a single residential land should not exceed 15%, and when the land price or premium rate reaches the upper limit, the bidder is determined by bidding for a reasonable one-time price, shaking the number and competing for higher and better construction quality.
It is expected that more cities will readjust the methods of land transfer and the details of land auction, setting the maximum price and shaking the number will become an important content, and key cities will enter the era of "taking land and shaking the number".
The profit margins in Shenzhen and Hangzhou will be released.
It is worth noting that if the land auction in 22 key cities in the future adopts lottery, one-time quotation and bidding, the overall land price trend will be further stabilized, and some urban project profits with significantly reduced profit margins will be released.
Which cities will become the main force to release profit space?
According to the gap between the first-round transaction land price and the actual land price of 22 cities and the first-round transaction premium level, CRIC divides these cities into three categories: cities with high premium and high construction; Cities with low land price and high allocation or high land price and low allocation; Cities with low premium and low proportion of construction.
Among these three types of cities, the cities with high premium and high proportion of construction have the largest release of profit space, and the profit increase can basically be above 20%. The profit margins of cities with low premium, high-level construction or high premium and low-level construction will also be released to a certain extent, and the increase is mostly within 15%. In cities with low premium and low allocation ratio, the profit margin has not changed much compared with before.
In terms of specific cities, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Xiamen, Hefei, Ningbo and other cities are typical of high premium and high construction. Taking Shenzhen as an example, the premium rate of the first round of centralized land auction was as high as 3 1%, and some hot plots were sold at the highest price, with a premium rate of 45%. In addition, the actual saleable floor price of the first round of centralized land auction in Shenzhen was as high as 25,654.38+0.00 yuan/square meter on average. Assuming that the premium rate is 15%, under the condition of non-competitive construction, the average price of saleable board in the first round of land transaction will be reduced to about10.5 million yuan/square meter, and the land acquisition cost will be reduced by more than 50%.
In addition, for Chengdu, Beijing and Chongqing, which have the highest premium rates, the profit margins released by the adjustment of local auction rules are mostly within 15%. Taking Chengdu as an example, the upper limit of the premium rate of the first round of centralized land auction in Chengdu is mostly within 10%, and the average premium rate is only 7%, but the average self-sustaining ratio of the land sold in Chengdu is as high as 16%, so the actual saleable board price of the first round of land sold in Chengdu is 12 173 yuan /m2, which is higher than the nominal land price. If there is no competition for construction, even if Chengdu raises the upper limit of premium rate to 15%, the profit rate of trading projects will increase by about 20%. Chongqing is the city with the highest average premium rate in the first round of centralized land auction. Under the "highest bidder" transfer mode, the average premium rate of urban land transfer is 43%. If the upper limit of premium rate is 15%, the average submission amount of the first round of land auction projects will decrease by at least 24% compared with that before adjustment, and the profit rate will also increase accordingly.
Qingdao, Changchun, Suzhou and Shanghai are cities with low premium and low allocation, and the profit space has not changed much.
On the whole, once the new land auction rules "boots land", the premium rate will not exceed 15% and the upper limit of land price, and the land ownership will be determined by lottery, one-time quotation and competitive bidding. Under the premise of stable housing prices, the profit rate of more than half of the cities will be higher than that of the first round, which will also help alleviate the cost pressure of housing enterprises.
Next, hot cities such as Shenzhen and Hangzhou will have the opportunity to obtain high-quality land. For the cities with high heat and high competition ratio in the first round of centralized land auction, the unit land acquisition cost is expected to be reduced by 20% compared with before. When the second and third centralized land auctions will be held deserves special attention.
It is worth noting that under the new rules of land auction, there may be a phenomenon of low long-term winning rate and uneven auction in the land market, which puts forward higher requirements for local governments, especially cities like Changsha and Zhengzhou, in determining the land supply structure and setting the conditions for transfer, so as to prevent large-scale auction.