Is the workplace environment in Beishangguang really that bad?
Recently, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the Ministry of Land and Resources jointly issued a big move to clarify the digestive cycle of commercial housing: if the digestive cycle exceeds 36 months, land supply will be stopped; 36 to1August, reducing land supply; /kloc-increase land supply from 0/2 to June; For less than 6 months, not only should the land supply be greatly increased, but also the pace of land supply should be accelerated.
This may be the most operational regulation of land supply so far. The core is two points: supply-side reform and expected management. All localities should be clear about which category they belong to and find a good position for themselves. But the question also comes: in the first-and second-tier cities with the most serious land shortage in the past, how to increase land supply this time? Or, are these first-and second-tier cities really "short of land"?
Where did the "land shortage" come from?
In the current economic and financial environment, "heavy" land supply may be the only means to stabilize housing prices. Counting the cities with stable housing prices in recent years are all cities with large land supply, such as Chongqing and Chengdu.
In the first-and second-tier cities with less land supply, the reasons for the shortage of land supply are nothing more than these:
Objectively speaking, the available land is indeed limited. The state's policy of controlling urban boundaries limits the old road of spreading pie in urban construction. To solve the problem of land supply, other aspects can not be ignored, such as the protection of permanent basic farmland, the limitation of construction land index, the limitation of urban spatial planning and so on. So it's really not easy to sort out a piece of land in the core area. The supply of residential land in first-and second-tier cities is almost declining year by year.
Secondly, there are indeed more constraints on large-scale land supply in first-and second-tier cities. If you want to provide land, you may not be able to provide it. The right to use state-owned commercial construction land is "net land", some plots can not meet the conditions for land supply, and the cost of land acquisition and demolition is too high. The government can't tear it down and entrust developers, so there is no profit. Therefore, if the annual land supply plan is not completed, it means that land acquisition may be more difficult.
Subjectively, local governments are unwilling to give up the greater value of land revenue brought by hunger marketing. Under the current background of land finance, local governments have the incentive to sell land at less high prices, rather than at more low prices. Therefore, the supply of land is always tight and the price is high.
Taking Beijing as an example, from 20 1 1 to 20 16, the total planned land supply in Beijing decreased from 6,500 hectares to 4 100 hectares year by year, and the completion rates were 88.2%, 72. 1% and 8/kloc respectively. The situation in Shanghai is that the completion rate of land supply plan over the years should be above 90%, but the supply plan itself is relatively small.
True and false lack of land
However, for first-and second-tier cities, is there really no room to increase the supply of housing? I'm afraid it's not that simple. Some insiders once said directly, "Except Shenzhen, probably no city is really short of land."
The particularity of Shenzhen is reflected in two aspects: First, Shenzhen is the only city in China where all land is owned by the state and there is no collective land. Secondly, the urban development level is basically saturated, and there is basically no stock of construction land for new development.
For more first-and second-tier cities, the more common problem is how to straighten out the relationship between land supply and housing supply. Where are these lands used in the annual land supply plans of various places? How much is used to meet the housing needs of ordinary people? This is a big problem that has been neglected for many years.
In fact, the number of new land supply announced by the Ministry of Land and Resources every year is not small. On the surface, land supply plans are increasing everywhere. But nationwide, the proportion of residential land is only 20% ~ 30%. In other words, non-residential land, such as industrial land and commercial service land, accounts for the bulk of new land every year. However, compared with the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain and other countries, the proportion of residential land in the new land is about 50% ~ 70%. Compared with Tokyo, Osaka, new york, Hongkong and other cities, the residential density and height of Beijing and Shanghai are far from each other.
Everyone says that housing demand in first-tier cities is in short supply and land is scarce. However, the actual reason for this impression is the serious dislocation of housing distribution. These cities may not lack land, what they lack is a reasonable division of land.
Theoretically, the proportion of residential land should be increased in cities with huge demand, but in reality, this adjustment according to actual demand has not been seen. Of course, it is also understandable that if local governments want to have GDP and tax revenue, increasing the proportion of residential land will inevitably affect industrial and commercial service land, drag down GDP growth and fall behind in regional competition. Therefore, most of the land is used for industrial and commercial development, resulting in a shortage of people with relatively large housing. In this way, how can market expectations not be bullish?
Where to find land?
So, where should hot cities find land? There are at least three ways to increase the housing supply: increasing the floor area ratio, bringing collective land into the market and revitalizing the stock.
When the elasticity of land supply is relatively small and the elasticity of demand is relatively large, the simplest way to control housing prices is to expand the floor area ratio. For example, the volume ratio of residential buildings has doubled, and the supply has at least doubled.
Judging from the index of floor area ratio, China's cities are generally low in the world. According to the 20 10 report of China International Finance Corporation, the average plot ratio of new commercial housing in China is 1.36, including 1.76 in first-tier cities and 1.53 in second-tier cities. In the same period, it was 4.5 in Hong Kong, 3.82 in Singapore, 2.5 in Seoul and 2.2 in Tokyo.
On collective land, Beijing has taken the lead. In the five-year land supply plan announced by Beijing this year, the amount of collective construction land reached 1 10,000 hectares, accounting for one sixth of the total planned land supply.
Previously, collectively operated construction land was mostly used for industry, warehousing and commercial services. Although Beijing began to build public rental housing on collective construction land from 20 12, it has not been widely spread for many years. Now it is proposed that collective construction land be included in the land supply plan, which is a policy breakthrough and also embodies the principle of "the same land, the same power and the same price" for state-owned land and collective land.
It is relatively difficult to revitalize the existing stock of construction land. Generally speaking, the industrial cycle is about 20 years, but the land use cycle is at least 40 years. At present, the modern service industry in big cities has begun to occupy a dominant position, and the traditional inefficient industrial and commercial land can be transformed into residential land by changing its functions. Obviously, it is impossible for the stock revitalization plans of cities to land smoothly.
First of all, the government can't tear it down, and the land ownership is complicated. To change the land use, it is necessary to adjust the regulatory detailed planning, which involves hearing, demonstration and approval, not to mention the unclear positioning of the relationship between the government and the market. The second is that it can't afford to pay. After the change of use, it is difficult to guarantee the space of industrial and commercial land, and the short-term tax revenue is affected. Afraid of the balance of examination and approval and the consideration of political achievements, the result is revitalization and stagnation Third, after the change of use, the government will allocate large-scale public facilities to provide land for education and medical care independently, which will put pressure on government expenditure.
In short, there are ways, but there are also many difficulties. If we can make changes in the above three aspects, the supply of housing can be increased several times, but there is still a lack of government mechanism and determination to use land space.