The two sides and results of the Battle of Yiling

Battle name: Battle of Yiling, also known as Battle of Yiling and Battle of Xiaoting.

The Battle of Yiling is one of the three major battles in the history of the Three Kingdoms. These three major battles are the Battle of Guandu, the Battle of Chibi, and the Battle of Yiling.

The warring parties: Sun Quan, Liu Bei

Commanders: Lu Xun, Liu Bei

The war broke out in 222 AD, between the Wu Kingdom (Sun Quan) and the Shu Han Dynasty (Sun Quan) during the Three Kingdoms period. Liu Bei) fought for the strategic location of eight counties in Jingzhou. It was also a famous successful example of active defense in the history of ancient Chinese wars. Edit this paragraph | Back to top Battle background After Cao Pi deposed Emperor Xian of Han, he established the State of Wei, and then Liu Bei and Sun Quan also established two states. In the Battle of Jingzhou, Guan Yu and his adopted son Guan Ping were killed by Sun Quan, King of Wu. Liu Bei did not listen to the advice of Prime Ministers Zhuge Liang and Zhao Yun, and decided to use all the strength of the country to attack Wu and avenge Guan Yu. After Sun Quan failed in several attempts for peace, he had no choice but to send the young Lu Xun as the commander-in-chief to stop him. "Loss of Jingzhou due to carelessness" comes from this battle. Edit this paragraph | Back to the top. The origin of the battle was that Sun Quan of the Eastern Wu Dynasty occupied Jingzhou, which destroyed Zhuge Liang's Longzhong strategy ("Longzhong Dui" said: "Conquer Han and Mian in the north, and use all the South China Sea. It connects Wuhui to the east and Bashu to the west. This is a country that uses military force, but its master cannot defend it. This is a country that is almost destined to be a general. Doesn't the general have any intention? . Liu Zhang is weak, Zhang Lu is in the north, the people are rich and the country is rich but they don't know how to care. The general is the king of the emperor, his loyalty is everywhere, and he is thirsty for talents. Protect the rocks to block it, make peace with the Rong in the west, pacify the Yiyue in the south, befriend Sun Quan externally, and cultivate political affairs internally. If the world changes, then order a general to lead the army of Jingzhou to Wan and Luo, and the general will lead the people of Yizhou. Coming out of Qinchuan, do the people dare not to eat pots of pulp to welcome the general? If this is the case, the hegemony will be achieved and the Han Dynasty will be prosperous.") Liu Bei did not have the conditions for unification. If Liu Bei wanted to destroy Cao Wei. Or to destroy Sun Wu, according to "Longzhong Dui", he must recapture Jingzhou, otherwise he can only rely on the Shu Road to separate one side. Whether it was for his own imperial career or to avenge his country and his family, Liu Bei had to recapture Jingzhou. However, because he was too eager to recapture Jingzhou, Liu Bei sent troops in a hurry when Shu was not prepared. Edit this paragraph | Return to the top of the battle content. The two sides had several battles, with wins and losses. Later, Lu Xun adopted a defensive strategy and could not hold on. This strategy disrupted Liu Bei's plan for a quick victory. Because the Shu Kingdom is located in a hilly area, it is very inconvenient to transport food. In addition, the weather at that time was very hot and muggy, which made the Shu army very depressed. So Liu Bei ordered his soldiers to garrison in dense woods and guard the camp. Lu Xun thought that the opportunity had come, so he launched an attack and burned the camp for 700 miles, defeating the Shu army.

After the Battle of Chibi in 208 AD, the strategically important Jingzhou, which governed eight counties north and south of the Yangtze River, was divided among Cao Cao, Liu Bei, and Sun Quan. Cao Cao occupied Nanyang and northern Jiangxia, Sun Quan occupied Nanjun and southern Jiangxia, and Liu Bei captured Changsha, Wuling, Lingling, and Guiyang counties. In 210 AD, at Liu Bei's request and Lu Su's persuasion, Sun Quan lent Liu Bei a strategic location on the north bank of the Yangtze River. In this way, Liu Bei actually basically controlled Jingzhou. Soon, Liu Bei captured Yizhou and Hanzhong successively, and the situation of the three kingdoms of Wei, Wu and Shu in history was formed. Hanzhong and Jingzhou are the two strategic bases of the Shu Han. From Hanzhong, you can go north to Tongguan and attack Chang'an; from Jingzhou, you can go north through Xiangyang to attack Xuchang, and from the east, you can go straight to the hinterland of the State of Wu, putting the Shu Han in a position where you can advance and attack, and retreat. Maintain a favorable position.

The Soochow regime, located in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, was deeply uneasy in the face of the rapid development of Liu Bei's power. Only because it was the same strategic goal for both sides to join forces to resist Cao Shang at that time, this conflict has not intensified for the time being. In 211 AD, after Sun Quan occupied Jiaozhou (today's Guangdong and Guangxi), his power further expanded; at that time, Cao Cao was busy annexing the forces of Ma Chao and Han Sui in Guanzhong to stabilize the rear, and had no time to look south. Sun Quan took this opportunity to demand the return of Jingzhou from Liu Bei, but Liu Bei refused to return it on the pretext that "Liangzhou must be obtained, and Jingzhou should be given to each other". The conflicts between the two countries have become increasingly acute, and they once met each other at war. In the end, although an agreement was reached to divide Jingzhou equally: with the Xiang River as the boundary, Sun Quan occupied Jiangxia, Changsha, and Guiyang, and Liu Bei occupied Nanjun, Wuling, and Lingling, but the contradiction between the two countries was not really eliminated.

In 219 AD, Sun Quan took advantage of the Shu Han Jingzhou garrison Guan Yu and led his army to attack Xiangyang and Fancheng in the north. He fought fiercely with Cao Wei's army, leaving the rear empty. He sent General Lu Meng to "cross the river in white" to attack Guan Yu. The rear base is Gangneung. After hearing the news, Guan Yu hurriedly led his army to rescue him, but was defeated and killed. Sun Quan then occupied the entire Jingzhou. As a result, the conflict between Sun and Liu intensified, eventually leading to the Battle of Yiling.

In 221 AD, Liu Bei proclaimed himself emperor in Chengdu. His country was named Han, his history was called Shu Han, and his reign was named Zhang Wu. A month later, Liu Bei decided to attack Wu on a large scale in an attempt to avenge Guan Yu and recapture Jingzhou. Emperor Wen of Wei Cao Pi was very happy to see the internal divisions and collapse of the Sun-Liu alliance, and took the opportunity to fan the flames, looking for opportunities to intensify the conflicts between Wu and Shu, so as to reap the benefits of the fishermen. On the Shu Han side, most of the ministers and generals including Zhuge Liang and Zhao Yun saw that a large-scale attack on Wu would be detrimental to Shu, so they repeatedly warned Liu Bei not to send troops to attack Wu. However, Liu Bei, who was in anger, could not listen to these opinions at all.

As for Sun Quan, after capturing Jingzhou, in order to consolidate his vested interests and not want to intensify the conflict between Wu and Shu, he sent envoys to Liu Bei twice to seek peace, but Liu Bei flatly rejected them both times. . Zhuge Jin (Zhuge Liang's brother), the governor of Nanjun in Soochow, also wrote to Liu Bei, stating his interests and hopes that Liu Bei would stop attacking Wu. Liu Bei also ignored it.

In July 221 AD, Liu Bei personally led an army of more than 100,000 people from the Shu Han Dynasty to launch a large-scale war against the Kingdom of Wu. At that time, the border between the two countries had moved westward to the vicinity of Wushan, and the Three Gorges of the Yangtze River had become the main channel between the two countries. Liu Bei sent generals Wu Ban and Feng Xi to lead more than 40,000 people as the vanguard to seize the gorge, invade the Wu territory, defeat the Wu army Li Yi and Liu Abu in Wudi (now Badong, Hubei), and occupy Zigui. In order to prevent Cao Wei from taking the opportunity to attack, Liu Bei sent General Huang Quan of Zhenbei to station on the north bank of the Yangtze River, and also sent his lieutenant Ma Liang to Wuling to win over the local tribal leader Samoko to raise troops to cooperate with the Shu Han army.

Facing the strategic attack of the Shu army, Sun Quan rose up to fight. He appointed Lu Xun, the general of the Right Guards and Zhenxi Army, as the Grand Governor, and led 50,000 people from Zhu Ran, Pan Zhang, Han Dang, Xu Sheng, Sun Huan and other troops to the front line to resist the Shu army; at the same time, he sent envoys to Cao Pi Promise to be repaired to avoid fighting on two fronts.

After Lu Xun took office, through careful analysis of the strength, morale and terrain conditions of both sides, he pointed out that Liu Bei had strong troops, was in a high position and defended danger, was vigorous and eager to win, and Wu Jun should temporarily avoid Shu. He waited for an opportunity to defeat the enemy, and patiently persuaded the generals of the Wu army to give up their demand for an immediate decisive battle. Decisively implemented a strategic retreat, retreating all the way to the front lines of Yidao (today's Yidu, Hubei) and Xiaoting (today's north of Yidu, Hubei). Then they stopped retreating there and turned to defense to contain the Shu army's continued advance. And concentrated their forces to prepare for a decisive battle. In this way, the Wu army completely withdrew from the high mountains and ridges, leaving hundreds of miles of mountainous terrain where it was difficult to deploy its troops to the Shu army.

In the first month of 222 AD, the naval forces of Wu Ban and Chen Shi of the Shu Han Dynasty entered the Yiling area and stationed troops on both sides of the Yangtze River. In February, Liu Bei personally led the main force from Zigui to Yiting and established a base camp. At this time, the Shu army had penetrated two to three hundred kilometers into the Wu territory. As it began to be blocked and resisted by the Wu army, its eastward advance came to a halt. With the Wu army holding on to key areas and refusing to fight, the Shu army had no choice but to set up dozens of camps along hundreds of miles from Wuxia, Jianping (today's north of Wushan, Sichuan) to Yiling. In order to mobilize Lu Xun to fight, Liu Bei sent his former governor Zhang Nan to lead some troops to besiege Sun Huan who was stationed in Yidao. Sun Huan was Sun Quan's nephew, so the generals of the Wu army requested to send troops to rescue him. However, Lu Xun knew that Sun Huan had won the hearts of the people and that Yi Dao City was well-supplied, so he resolutely rejected the suggestion of dividing his troops to assist Yi Dao, avoiding dispersion and overreaching. The act of consuming troops early.

Schematic diagram of Lu Xun’s counterattack in the Battle of Yiling. From the first month to June, the two armies were still at a stalemate. In order to quickly engage in a decisive battle with the Wu army, Liu Bei frequently sent people to the front of the battle line to insult and challenge, but Lu Xun remained calm and ignored them. Later, Liu Bei sent Wu Ban to lead thousands of people to set up camp on the ground, and he also ambushed 8,000 troops in the valley, trying to lure the Wu army into battle and wait for an opportunity to gather and annihilate them. But this plan still failed to succeed. Lu Xun insisted on not fighting, which destroyed Liu Bei's strategic intention of relying on superior troops to achieve a quick victory. The officers and soldiers of the Shu army gradually lost their fighting spirit and lost their active advantage. In June in the south of the Yangtze River, it was the scorching summer season. The heat was so intense that the officers and soldiers of the Shu army suffered terribly. Liu Bei had no choice but to move the navy boats to land, set up military camps in deep mountains and dense forests, close to streams, and stationed troops to rest and prepare to wait until autumn before launching an attack. Since the Shu army was located on a rugged mountain road about 200 to 300 kilometers away from the Wu border, far away from the rear, there were many difficulties in logistical support. In addition, Liu Bei's hundred-mile company camp had scattered troops, which provided an opportunity for Lu Xun to carry out a strategic counterattack. .

Seeing that the morale of the Shu army was depressed, Lu Xun gave up the combat policy of advancing by land and water and flanking the Wu army, believing that the time was ripe for a strategic counterattack. For this reason, he wrote to Sun Quan, King of Wu, saying: At the beginning of the battle, what I was worried about was that the Shu army would advance by land and water, and the Jiajiang River would go straight down. The Shu army is now on land and setting up camps everywhere. Judging from its deployment, there will be no changes. In this way, there will be an opportunity to take advantage of it, and there will be no difficulty in defeating the Shu army. Sun Quan immediately approved Lu Xun's battle plan to shift from defense to counterattack.

On the eve of launching a large-scale counterattack, Lu Xun first sent a small force to conduct a tentative attack. Although this attack failed, Lu Xun found a way to defeat the enemy - the method of attacking the Shu army camp with fire. Because it was the hot summer season in the south of the Yangtze River at that time, the climate was sultry, and the Shu army's camps were all built with wooden fences, and they were surrounded by woods and thatch. Once a fire broke out, they would be burned to pieces.

After the decisive battle began, Lu Xun ordered the Wu soldiers each to hold a handful of thatch, raid the Shu army camp at night, and set fire to the wind. Suddenly the fire became fierce and the Shu army was in chaos. Lu Xun took advantage of the situation and launched a counterattack, forcing the Shu army to retreat westward. Wu general Zhu Ran led an army of 5,000 men to first break through the Shu army's forward, thrust into the rear of the Shu army, and surrounded the Shu army with Han Dang's troops in Zhuoxiang (today's west of Yichang, Hubei), cutting off the Shu army's retreat. Pan Zhang's troops attacked Shu army Feng Xi's troops and defeated them. The tribes of Zhuge Jin, Luo Tong, and Zhou Yin cooperated with Lu Xun's main force to attack the Shu army at Xiaoting. Sun Huan's tribe, who was guarding Yi Dao, also took the initiative to attack and join the battle. The Wu army made good progress, and soon broke through more than 40 Shu army camps, and used the navy to cut off the connection between the two sides of the Yangtze River of the Shu army.

The Shu generals Zhang Nan and Feng Xi and the indigenous tribe leader Samoko were killed in the battle. Du Lu, Liu Ning and others surrendered. Seeing that the entire front line collapsed, Liu Bei fled to Ma'an Mountain northwest of Yiling, and ordered the Shu army to surround the mountain to defend themselves. Lu Xun concentrated his troops, besieged on all sides, and annihilated tens of thousands of Shu troops. At this point, the Shu army was defeated, most of them were killed or wounded and fled, and all their vehicles, boats and other military supplies were lost. Liu Bei broke out at night and escaped to Shimen Mountain (now northeast of Badong, Hubei Province). He was pursued by Wu general Sun Huanbu and was almost captured. The rearguard general Fu Tong and others were killed. Later, relying on the staff of the post station to burn the equipment abandoned by the defeated troops and blocking the mountain road, they were able to escape from the pursuers and escape into Yong'an City (also called Baidi City, east of Fengjie, Sichuan today).

At this time, Huang Quan, the general of the Shu army in Zhenbei, was defending the Wei army in the north of the Yangtze River. After Liu Bei's defeat, Huang Quan's return route was cut off by the Wu army, and he had no choice but to lead his troops to surrender to Cao Wei in August.

After Liu Bei fled to Baidi City, Wu generals Pan Zhang, Xu Sheng and others advocated pursuing the victory and expanding the results. Lu Xun was worried that Cao Wei would take the opportunity to fish in troubled waters and attack the rear, so he stopped the pursuit and took the initiative to withdraw his troops. In September, Cao Wei indeed attacked Wu, but because Lu Xun had been prepared, the Wei army finally returned without success. In April of the following year, Liu Bei was so humiliated by the defeat at Yiling that he fell ill and died in Baidi City. This is how the Battle of Yiling ended.

The Battle of Yiling was Liu Bei's last battle. He had nearly 100,000 troops, but he was defeated by Lu Xun of Soochow. It should be said that this was the battle that truly established the three pillars of the Three Kingdoms: Wu occupied Jingzhou, and Shu Han retained Xichuan. The weakening of the Shu-Wu alliance also reduced the military pressure on Wei, which was entering a period of recuperation (when Cao Cao died and Cao Pi became emperor). The territory of the three parties for the next few decades was basically determined. The Shu Han completely lost the strategic military base of Jingzhou (Hanzhong and Jingzhou are the two strategic bases of the Shu Han. From Hanzhong, you can go north to Tongguan and attack Chang'an; from Jingzhou, you can go north through Xiangyang to attack Xuchang, and from the east, you can go straight to the hinterland of Wu. This put the Shu Han in a favorable position to attack both Wei and Wu, and to retreat and defend). Most of the troops participating in the battle died in the battle or surrendered. Many generals and counselors died in battle and surrendered. The national power suffered a huge loss, which further weakened the Shu-Wu alliance. These also indirectly caused Zhuge Liang's subsequent The situation of entangled with the Wei State for decades but always with no success, "died before leaving the army". The defeat in the Battle of Yiling had a lot to do with Liu Bei's tactical mistakes, and it was the biggest strategic mistake in his life. How could Liu Bei, who "keeps his emotions in check", make such a huge strategic mistake? Moreover, he launched the Battle of Yiling despite the objections of his most trusted Zhuge Liang, Zhao Yun and other old ministers.

In the Battle of Yiling, Lu Xun was good at accurately analyzing the enemy's situation, boldly retreating to lure the enemy, concentrating his forces, attacking later, defeating his fatigue, skillfully using fire attacks, and finally defeated Wu's 50,000-strong inferior army in one fell swoop. The Shu army created a successful example of transitioning from defense to counterattack, which demonstrated superb command art and military talent, showing that he was worthy of being an outstanding military commander. As for Liu Bei's failure, it was not accidental. He "raised the army with anger" and relied on force to advance rashly, which violated the taboo of military strategists. In terms of specific combat guidance, he ignored the geographical advantages and led the army into two to three hundred kilometers of rugged mountain roads that were difficult to deploy. At the same time, in the face of the Wu army's stubborn resistance, he did not know how to change the combat deployment in time and took the wrong step. The unfocused method of setting up camps everywhere finally fell into passivity, leading to a tragic failure and the consequences of "overthrowing the army and killing generals", which is deeply regrettable.

The Battle of Yiling also had a great impact on the situation of the Three Kingdoms. For the Shu Han, it greatly damaged the national power and basically destroyed the grand strategic blueprint formulated by Zhuge Liang during the Longzhong Countermeasures. For Soochow, although they won the war, it further damaged the relationship between Wu and Shu. From a strategic point of view, it also broke the possibility of the Sun and Liu families to unite to resist Cao Cao, laying the foundation for the subsequent destruction of Wu and Shu in the future. A foreshadowing was made. Edit this paragraph | Back to top Battle analysis The Shu army had nearly 100,000 troops (called 700,000 in the novel), while Sun gave Lu Xun only 50,000 troops. In terms of logistics, the Shu army sent Zhao Yun to supervise the provision of grain and grass, so it was not affected by grain and grass. fail. The reason why Liu Bei failed was precisely because he did not have the right time, place and people. These three taboos were: He chose the right time to attack Wu in the scorching heat. Wu was nothing as a defensive country, but Shu, as an attacking country, braved the scorching sun every day to march. , the soldier's age and body gradually weakened. If it were just the right time, the Shu army could still rely on the number of soldiers to win. But the lack of geographical advantage created a good opportunity for Lu Xun to attack by surprise. The Shu army was stationed in a densely wooded area. Although it was close to the river, there was no way to resist the Wu army's attack. The most fatal thing is that Liu Bei had no one to make peace with. He did not listen to Zhuge Liang's advice before the expedition, and after the expedition, he arranged for Zhao Yun, who was both wise and brave, to destroy the food and grass. Finally, Ma Liang persuaded him not to garrison troops in dense woods and refused to listen. This created a good opportunity for Lu Xun's attack. Therefore, Liu Bei's failure is inevitable.