How did the Taiping Army's "Tianjingcheng" fall and how did Hong Xiuquan die?

The Taiping Army failed in its second expedition to the west, which led to the fall of Anqing. Since then, the situation has turned sharply, Tianjing has been in danger, and the defense of Tianjing has entered a decisive battle stage.

At this time, Li Xiucheng conquered Hangzhou again, sweeping a large area of land in western Zhejiang and eastern Zhejiang. Although it was also a victory in part of the war, it was not a compensation for the loss of the Taiping Army's western front, let alone a role in supporting the defense of Tianjing. On the contrary, the military progress in Zhejiang has deepened the unfavorable situation of the Taiping Army's two-faced operation, and the military victory in Zhejiang has accelerated the fall of Nanjing.

since 1862, the main battle of Tianjing was the Battle of Tianjing, followed by the invasion of Huainan.

On the eve of Tianjing Battle, in order to cope with the military situation of fighting on both sides, Li Xiucheng advocated taking a defensive position against the Xiang army under Tianjing City, in an attempt to avoid its spirit first and then attack its feelings. On the other hand, it advocates taking an offensive and planning to occupy Shanghai; Consolidate Suzhou and Hangzhou. On the contrary, this strategy of inversion of offensive and defensive is conducive to the deployment of the so-called "it seems appropriate to defend first and then fight, and stand firm" in the periphery of Tianjing.

in August, 1862, Li Xiucheng invited the kings to hold the second military meeting in Suzhou to discuss the operational deployment and decided to divide the troops and rescue Tianjing in three ways. That is, Yang Fuqing and other troops were sent to attack Ningguo in southern Anhui to contain the enemy's reinforcements, and Chen Kunshu and other troops were sent to attack Jinzhuguan in Wuhu to cut off the enemy's route for providing foodstuff. Li Xiucheng was advancing against the enemy outside Tianjing.

In mid-October, the Li Xiucheng Army began to storm the Xiang Army Camp in Yuhuatai. The Taiping Army had an advantage in both strength and firepower in this campaign, and the offensive was extremely fierce, which made Zeng Guofan, who was far away in Anqing, admit:

"Alarms are coming, like in stormy waves" and "The danger of the north and south of the Yangtze River is as heavy as eggs".

However, after 46 days of battle, the Taiping Army ended in vain. Regarding the reasons for the failure of this battle, Li Xiucheng himself admitted:

"We came in August without winter clothes, and it was cold in September, and the soldiers had no food, so we couldn't accomplish anything here."

in fact, this is just an objective difficulty derived from strategic mistakes. Li Xiucheng's strategic mistake in this battle was, first of all, to use the main forces of Taiping rebels in the face-to-face battle, and to use a lot of firepower in the battle, but once the ammunition was used up, he had to retreat in frustration. If we can insert the main force of Taiping Army behind the enemy, outflank the enemy and cut off its supply lines and grain routes, the war situation will definitely change.

Moreover, at the beginning of the battle, Zeng Guofan was so worried that he was afraid that "if the thieves came again, the road would be completely cut off and an ant would burst its banks". However, Zeng Guofan was concerned, but he was despised by Li Xiucheng.

Secondly, Li Xiucheng failed to concentrate on this battle. As soon as he learned that "Wang was defeated by four ports in Shanghai, all his shares were wiped out, and Su Kun was empty", he hurried back to take care of his territory, and the Tianjing battle ended in defeat.

In order to make up for the defeat of Tianjing Battle, Hong Xiuquan ordered Li Xiucheng to carry out the Huainan Campaign and carry out the strategic plan of "attacking the south from the north", which can be said that he imitated the plan of "encircling Wei to save Zhao", and the failure was even worse.

The so-called "going north to attack south" has three strategic objectives:

First, the Taiping Army crossed the river and marched north, so that the Xiang Army on the south bank could rescue the hinterland of the north bank, thus solving the danger of Tianjing.

Second, Huainan is a grain-producing area, and occupying it can relieve the grain shortage in Tianjing.

Third, we can get in touch with help the king Chen Decai and Nian Jun Zhang Luoxing in northern Anhui to revive the situation in southern Anhui.

However, these intentions were soon discovered by Zeng Guofan. Zeng Guofan personally went from Anqing to Tianjing, and commanded the Xiang army to break all the stone barricades that the Taiping Army defended Tianjing. In this way, the Taiping Army "attacked the north" not only failed to lead the Xiang army on the south bank to save Tianjing, but had to save Tianjing himself.

Besides, when Li Xiucheng entered the Huainan area, it happened that there was no food for the land and the Taiping Army, and many people starved to death. Li Xiucheng army met this desperate situation, where it still got food to support Tianjing. As for Zhang Luoxing, the twisting army in northern Anhui, it was unfortunately defeated by the Qing army at this time. There were few other leaders left, and the situation in northern Anhui was devastated.

In this way, Li Xiucheng's three strategic objectives of invading Huainan were all frustrated.

in June p>1863, due to the crisis in Tianjing and Suzhou, Li Xiucheng was summoned back to Tianjing by the heavenly king, and the Taiping Army crossed the river in Jiangpu area. But at that time, just as the river was rising, the road was washed away by the water and there was nowhere to walk. Moreover, the flood was severe, and the officers and men had no shelter. Although they had rice, they didn't have firewood to cook, and they starved to death. Just as Yang Shuai and Peng Shuai's water army came to attack, they lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers before and after this move. This is the heavy loss caused by the strategy of "attacking the south from the north".

Li Xiucheng began to participate in the Soviet-Zhejiang War in June 1863 after the defeat of the Huainan Campaign. After Suzhou fell, Li Xiucheng returned to Tianjing. In November this year, Zeng Guofan's army had captured all the town strongholds on the periphery of Tianjing. According to the unfavorable situation of Tianjing at that time, only the Taiping Gate and Shence Gate in Tianjing were still connected with the outside world, and foreign aid was cut off. Li Xiucheng proposed to Hong Xiuquan the idea of "Let the city stay", namely:

"The capital can't be conservative. Zeng Guofan's handsome soldiers are very trapped, and the city is deep and solid. There is little food and grass inside, and it can't be saved from outside. Let the city stay ... If you don't follow the minister's advice, the six things will be fixed!" .

When this proposal was presented to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom generals for discussion, it was approved by everyone, but Hong Xiuquan rejected the only feasible plan of "Let the city not go" at that time.

from the end of February to April, 1864, the Xiang army occupied the Taiping Gate and Shence Gate, and completed the encirclement of Tianjing. At this time, the Taiping Army in the city was a water without a source. After four months of tragic guarding city and street fighting, most of the Taiping Army died and one set himself on fire.

At this point, the defense of Tianjing, which lasted for three years, failed in an all-round way. The fall of Tianjing marked the failure of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. 2 Death of Hong Xiuquan

Due to the lack of historical materials and contradictions among various historical materials, there are different opinions about the death of Hong Xiuquan.

When it comes to Hong Xiuquan's "suicide by taking poison", as the General History of China written by Mr. Fan Wenlan says, "On June 1, 1864, Hong Xiuquan took poison to die."

When Hong Xiuquan died of illness, the Outline of China History edited by Mr. Jian Bozan said that he died on June 1st after being ill in mid-May, 1864.

On the whole, Hong Xiuquan fell ill before his death, and his health deteriorated extremely, but the direct cause of his death should be that he committed suicide by taking poison during his illness and died.

On May 3, 1864, the day before Hong Xiuquan's death, an imperial edict was issued:

"If people feel at ease, they will go to heaven together, and receive heavenly soldiers from the heavenly father and heavenly brother to protect Tianjing."

This imperial edict shows that Tianjing is in danger, and Hong Xiuquan is unwilling to be a prisoner. He is determined to die as a dying exhortation. It was the day after this imperial edict that he suddenly died suddenly.

According to the symptoms of Hong Xiuquan at that time, he didn't suffer from a fatal emergency. Hong Rengan, Li Xiucheng and others said that he was "sick for twenty years" and "he didn't take any prescription, so he was able to get well", which is proof. Therefore, it is probably unfounded to regard Hong Xiuquan's sudden death as an emergency death.

Before Hong Xiuquan fell ill, he felt tired of the world, expecting a dragon car to take him to heaven, which was consistent with the imperial edict of going to heaven issued by Hong Xiuquan the day before his death, indicating that Hong Xiuquan had already prepared for an emergency, and when the time came, he died.

In addition, when Tianjing was in crisis, Hong Xiuquan wrote a poem saying:

"Why did God change his mind when he tried the depth of the grass bridge? I didn't see brother Tian lay down his life, and the blood was dripping on the cross. I don't see the pioneer and the leader, and I am honored by the people in heaven! "

In the face of the country's death, Hong Xiuquan could not accept Li Xiucheng's aggressive strategy of "Don't let the city go", but only showed his determination to die for the country by committing suicide.

His sudden death was not so much a death from critical illness as a suicide during illness, which was more in line with Hong Xiuquan's ideological development and physical health at that time.