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Why did Russia have a hard time fighting the first Chechen War?

The first Chechen War occurred from 1994 to 1996. It was a military conflict between Russia and Chechen militants.

The first Chechen War brought heavy casualties to the Russian army. According to official figures, the death toll of the Russian army was 3,826, the wounded were 17,892, and 1,906 were missing. In addition, the war also resulted in the death of more than 100,000 civilians and severe damage to a large number of facilities. In the next three years, although Chechnya was still a member of the Russian Federation, it actually enjoyed de facto independence.

The First Chechen War (1994-1996)

The Chechen Republic is one of the 89 federal subjects of Russia. It is located in the North Caucasus region and covers an area of ​​about 2 Thousands of square kilometers, Chechnya is rich in oil and is a hub for oil and gas pipelines and railway transportation to various parts of Central Asia. Its strategic position is very important. With a population of more than 1.2 million, most of the residents believe in Islam, which is very different from Russia, which believes in Orthodox Christianity, in terms of race and culture. For this reason, Chechnya has seen an endless stream of people seeking independence. Dudayev was elected President of Chechnya in October 1991, and in January 1995 announced that Chechnya would secede from the Russian Federation and establish an independent Chechen Republic, which triggered a protracted Chechen crisis. Dudayev pursued a policy of confrontation with the Russian Federation Central Committee in Chechnya and recruited troops to form his own armed forces.

The course of the war

In December 1994, the Russian government sent troops to Chechnya in order to prevent the separatist activities of the Chechen gangs, and the first Chechen War broke out. From the outbreak of the war in December 1994 to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in February 1996, the Russian troops suffered 3,837 casualties, 13,270 wounded, 337 missing, and 432 prisoners; they lost 5 aircraft, 8 combat helicopters, tanks, and armor There were more than 500 transport vehicles, infantry combat vehicles and armored reconnaissance vehicles; 15,000 Chechen militants died, and 40,000 were injured and captured. The West estimates that the death toll of the Russian army exceeded 10,000. The most tragic failure for Russia was that large-scale military operations failed to achieve their goals, laying the foundation for subsequent years of terrorist activities.

Attack on Grozny

During the attack on Grozny, the Russian army and the Dudayev elements engaged in street fighting. The battle line was stretched too long. Sometimes the distance between the Russian army and the Chechen armed forces was only a few meters. Ten meters. At this time, when the Russian aviation force provides fire support, the pilots and navigation guides have particularly high accuracy requirements for targeting and bombing. The results of actual combat were regrettable. According to Russian airborne troops and infantrymen who participated in the battle to capture Grozny, due to large aiming errors and inaccurate guidance, accidental bombings occurred many times. Buildings that had been completely captured by the Russian army were often bombarded. Our aviation bombs and uncontrolled rocket attacks caused heavy losses. Despite this, Russian aviation played a very important role in the battle to capture Grozny.

Blow up the passage

In early January 1995, Su-24 bombers launched KAB-1500L laser-guided bombs, destroying two roads on the Argon River leading to the eastern suburbs of Grozny. bridges through which car bandits have been transporting reserves to war zones. Camera control data shows that this laser-guided missile has high accuracy and a very good bombing effect. The use of high-precision weapons ensures that the Russian aviation force can continuously carry out precise strikes against small targets such as car bandit firepower points, armored equipment, and even facilities in Grozny under poor weather conditions. In order to ensure night reconnaissance in the theater, the Tu-22M3 also regularly dropped illumination bombs over Grozny, which also suppressed to some extent the sabotage activities of the small subversive team of the Dudayev gang in the rear of the Russian army at night.

A model of precision strike

The most successful example of precision strike by the Russian Air Force aviation during this period was the bombing of the defense center of Grozny and the Dudayev Presidential Palace. At the beginning of the battle to capture Grozny, the Russian army originally wanted to keep the city's infrastructure intact, especially the presidential palace. However, after paying a bloody price, it finally understood that it was absolutely impossible to capture the Chechen capital without any effort. The army was forced to engage in brutal street battles with car bandits, capturing every building and block, and gradually advancing. At this time, the necessity of destroying the illegal armed headquarters is self-evident. Therefore, before Russian federal forces entered the center of Grozny, aviation began to carry out devastating precision strikes on the Chechen presidential palace.

The Presidential Palace is the former office building of the Grozny State Committee of the Soviet Union. Because it is located in the Caucasus earthquake-prone zone, the building is very solid and has strong earthquake resistance. There are 500 militants hidden inside. The Russian artillery bombardment failed to achieve the expected results, so it decided to use Air Force fighter planes, using BETAB-500 aerial bombs and S-24 heavy uncontrolled rockets that can destroy reinforced concrete bunkers. On January 17-18, 1995, as long as the weather conditions improved and were suitable for combat flights, Russian attack aircraft began to bomb the presidential palace. As a result, they accurately hit Dudayev's underground command bunker under the building. Dudayev I was outside the city at the time and escaped. Later, when I was using satellite phone communication in the mountainous area, the signal was intercepted by the Russian army. A Su-25 attack aircraft waiting in the air launched a precision-guided bomb. Dudayev was blown up on the spot. die.

Turning Point

The Russian army did not announce the specific number of casualties among the car bandits when they bombed the Chechen Presidential Palace. However, the casualties would not be too small. At least 130 car bandits were bombed in the underground bunker alone. die. More importantly, the air raid on the Presidential Palace dealt a heavy blow to the resistance of the car bandits. The content of radio communications intercepted by the Russian army showed that the militants who were defending the Presidential Palace began to panic and soon retreated without a fight, leaving only a few Snipers guarded the area, trying to use cold shots to kill them together with the Russian army.

On January 19, 1995, the battle to capture Grozny ushered in a major turning point. The Russian 20th Volgograd Guards Division Reconnaissance Battalion captured the presidential palace and eliminated the lurking snipers. Dudayev elements withdrew from the city center and continued to resist in the so-called "defensive rear", that is, in the south and southeast of Grozny, Katayama and Black River, where they consolidated defenses, but their morale was obviously low. Chechen illegal armed forces assembled in the Minutka Square area of ​​Grozny were attacked by a series of artillery and air attacks by the Russian army. The main force of Dudayev elements began to evacuate the Chechen capital and fled to the southern mountains. In order to make full use of this advantageous fighter aircraft, the Russian Air Force's frontline aviation and army aviation took control of the road where the bandits tried to break out and escape from Grozny, and completely destroyed two armored transport vehicles and more than 50 trucks and cars transporting militants.

After ground forces captured the North Grozny Airport, Russian Army helicopter units immediately began to deploy at the airport. On January 18, 1995, the first Russian military transport aircraft landed at this airport. From the beginning of February 1995, the airport entered full working order.

Of course, the Russian aviation’s combat operations are not limited to Grozny. On January 25, 1995, 18 Su-25 attack aircraft destroyed the Dudayev elements' underground ammunition and military material warehouses in four silos of the former intercontinental ballistic missile site of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces in Bamut. Another large ammunition depot north of the village of Arshid was also destroyed by Russian Su-25 fighter jets, and the assembly area of ​​Chechen militants' manpower and armored equipment in Shali Town was also attacked by air strikes.

A dark day for the aviation force

However, for Army aviation helicopter pilots, January 25, 1995 was also the darkest day. On that day, two Mi-24 helicopters were in combat. Shot down, 2 pilots killed.

Russian Air Force fighter planes successfully reduced losses to the greatest extent. 12 attack planes were hit by ground anti-aircraft fire, and all suffered varying degrees of combat damage. In the end, they all returned to the airport safely, and one of the planes was stable. The instrument was hit, an engine of another fighter plane was hit, and the rest of the planes were hit by bullets or shells. On February 3, 1995, it suffered casualties for the first time. A Su-24 bomber was flying at low altitude in thick fog and accidentally hit the mountain southeast of Chevlenaya Station. The aircraft was destroyed and everyone was killed. The cause of the accident may have been the aircraft. Onboard navigation system failure. On February 4, 1995, while carrying out an attack on the support point of the car bandits 2 kilometers south of the Chechen-Aura settlement, a Su-25 attack aircraft was shot down by the firepower of the car bandit's "Shilka" air defense system. The pilot Baylov The major successfully ejected, but his subsequent fate is unknown. He was most likely killed by militants on the spot after landing.

On February 6, 1995, the Russian federal troops forcibly crossed the Sunza River and encountered almost no resistance. They quickly eliminated the militants who were "defending the rear." In the battle against the last resistance center of the car bandits in the city of Grozny, the Russian army actively used aviation units to carry out violent bombing of the consolidated defense areas of Heihe and Katayama. Especially in the Heihe area, the car bandits had strong air defense cover. In order to avoid losses, Army aviation helicopters used for the first time a tactic not stipulated in previous combat doctrine: launching S-24 uncontrolled rockets when the aircraft was in an upward position. The missile range was increased to 6-7 kilometers. Attack outside the weapon's killing area. Of course, using this tactic will reduce the hit accuracy, but when striking ground targets, the ammunition hit accuracy is still very satisfactory. After that, Army Hangbing began to use this tactic extensively.

Risk of surprise attack

Air force frontline aviation and Army aviation usually operate jointly to perform combat missions. On February 10, 1995, 11 Mi-24 helicopters and 6 Su-25 attack aircraft carried out a series of attacks on the fortifications of the bandits in the Heihe consolidated defense area. Army helicopters not only attacked pre-selected targets, but also bombed temporary targets in response to calls from ground forces. , and also freely hunt various enemy targets. Similar raids are risky because hunting operations are usually carried out over enemy-occupied territory. For example, in the operation in the Gudermes area, the Mi-24 squadron searched and destroyed targets three times independently. The first two were very successful and destroyed They acquired an armored transport vehicle, a self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery system, and an ammunition depot. However, during the third operation, the prepared militants counterattacked, and the three helicopters were attacked by the bandit ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns and light weapons with intensive firepower. It was hit and severely damaged. One of them made an emergency landing on the Russian military position. It was later retired early due to excessive damage and could not be repaired. Fortunately, no casualties were suffered.

Temporarily calm situation

In early March 1995, the Russian army completely liberated the city of Grozny and its suburbs, drove the militants to the southern mountains, and ushered in a temporary calm situation. A brief summary of the early combat situation can be made.

From December 1, 1994 to March 17, 1995, the Russian Air Force aviation destroyed 265 enemy training fighter jets, 3 helicopters, 20 tanks, 25 armored transport vehicles, and 6 self-propelled air defense systems in Chechnya. , 10 artillery pieces, more than 130 military vehicles, and destroyed 7 bridges, several ammunition depots, several fuel and ammunition depots, and other military targets. During this period, two Russian Air Force fighter jets crashed, and 14 fighter jets were hit by ground anti-aircraft fire and suffered combat damage. All damaged fighter jets returned to combat after repairs. During the active combat phase before mid-June 1995, the Russian Army Aviation also destroyed a large number of enemy targets and suffered heavy losses. In the first three months alone, 5 helicopters (2 meters) were completely lost. -8, 3 Mi-24), 9 pilots died.

From March 6, 1995 to March 20, 1995, the situation in Chechnya was relatively calm. The Russian troops that had captured Grozny advanced to the strategic point near the city of Argon. However, the Russian army did not pursue the victory and capture Argon in time. Instead, it tried to negotiate with the Dudayev elements. The Russian authorities soon understood that the militants had no sincerity in peace talks at all and were only using the negotiation time to gain precious breathing space, redeploy and consolidate defensive positions. The North Caucasus Cluster Command of the Russian Federation Forces foresaw that the two sides might restart the war at any time, and immediately strengthened its forces in Chechnya and nearby border areas. The number of Army Aviation helicopters deployed at Mozdok, Beslan, and North Grozny airports increased from 55 There are 105 aircraft, of which 52 are Mi-24 armed helicopters.

Assault

In order to prevent the car bandits from replenishing reserve personnel and strengthening their strength, the Russian Air Force's frontline aviation and army aviation launched attacks on Dudayev elements in Shali, Ataj, and Meskl - Multiple missile and bomb attacks were carried out on assembly areas in the Yurt and Shaami-Yurt areas. On the night of March 21, 1995, the Russian army launched an offensive. That night, the Northern Group of motorized infantry and marines surrounded the city of Argonne. On March 22, 1995, Chechen militants under the cover of tanks attempted to lift the siege of the city of Argonne by the Russian army from the directions of Shali and Gudermes. Russian Air Force attack aircraft and Army Aviation helicopter gunships immediately took off to join the battle, launching "strike" The guided missile destroyed 9 tanks and armored vehicles of the bandits, and fired S-8 uncontrolled rockets to kill a large number of the bandit infantry. The Dudayev elements suffered heavy casualties and were unable to confront the Russian army head-on, so they fled one after another. On March 23, 1995, Russian troops liberated the city of Argonne. On March 30, 1995, the Russian army liberated Gudermes, the second largest city in Chechnya.

Unlike the attack on Grozny, when liberating Argon and Gudermes, the Russian aviation operations did not cause major damage to the city. They only carried out precise attacks on vehicle bandit fire support points and armored equipment positions on the outskirts of the city. In response to the attack, the Dudayev elements also wisely gave up their stubborn resistance and street fighting tactics that might cause greater casualties. They withdrew to the mountains with little resistance, broke into pieces, and engaged in sneak attacks.

On March 31, 1995, the Russian federal troops captured the city of Shali after a fierce battle. The main force of a tank regiment deployed by the bandits was basically eliminated. In order to avoid civilian casualties, the Russian army attacked the city. Aviation was not used.

Improvements in April 1995

In April 1995, the meteorological conditions over Chechnya improved a lot. The thick winter fog began to dissipate. Most of the time, it will be tomorrow. The sun is shining brightly, and Russian attack aircraft and armed helicopters can show off their skills. On April 8-9, 1995, Army Air Force armed helicopters carried out intensive attacks on the consolidated defensive positions of the Abkhaz Battalion of the Dudayev gang in the forest area southeast of the village of Samashki. In mid-April 1995, the Russian army launched a fierce offensive against the village of Bamut where 750-1,000 militants were stationed. The bandits were well-equipped with armored transport vehicles, field artillery, and mortars, and the battle was brutal. On April 15, 1995, the Russian army's first assault on the village failed. The troops participating in the storm were violently counterattacked by armed elements occupying the commanding heights and were forced to retreat. On April 17, 1995, Army Aviation and Frontline Aviation began to bomb the firepower and support points of the vehicle bandits in and near Bamut Village. The vehicle bandits suffered heavy losses, gave up their resistance, and fled to the mountains. On the 18th, Russian federal troops occupied the village of Bamut. The local elders negotiated with the Russian commander to ensure that illegal militants would no longer be allowed to enter the mountain village, and the Russian army immediately evacuated the village.

New tactics bring new situations

From the battles of Shali and Bamut, we can discover the new combat use characteristics of Russian aviation: minimize the participation of aviation in combat, and strive to avoid innocent people Civilian casualties and property losses, ground forces usually launch attacks without aviation pre-strike on the attack target, and only call attack aircraft and armed helicopters to provide fire support after encountering stubborn resistance. However, although this new combat practice significantly reduced civilian casualties, it increased the losses of the Russian army, at the expense of the blood of Russian soldiers. At the end of May 1995, when the main battle moved to relatively sparsely populated mountainous areas, the Russian army gave up this tactic and re-increased the use of aviation in combat.

After the fighting in April 1995, the Russian army established control of all plain areas from the Greater Caucasus Mountains to Chechen.

On April 26, 1995, President Yeltsin signed an order declaring a moratorium on the use of force in Chechnya to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The ceasefire period was from April 28, 1995 to May 12, 1995.

As before when negotiating a ceasefire, the Dudayev elements made full use of this rare breathing opportunity to replenish their forces and consolidate their positions. At the same time, they never gave up the opportunity to attack Russian military inspection stations and convoys. The Russian army has not relaxed its vigilance, and its aviation forces continue to patrol and conduct reconnaissance flights over Chechnya. On April 30, 1995, the Russian aviation force was attacked by militants while patrolling over the village of Giliany in southeastern Chechnya. A Mi-24 helicopter was hit by anti-aircraft machine gun fire. The pilot tried his best to fly the severely damaged helicopter. The helicopter flew away from the area controlled by the bandits and made an emergency landing in Dagestan. The pilot was not injured and the helicopter was completely scrapped. The second similar incident here was not so lucky. On May 5, 1995, two Su-25 attack aircraft were patrolling and flying over the village of Benoy. Major Sarabeev piloted the Su-25 lead plane and flew over a building at low altitude. On the hill, the car bandits used a DSHK machine gun to attack suddenly on the flanking hillside. The bullet penetrated the unarmored canopy glass. The pilot was killed on the spot. The aircraft plummeted rapidly and hit the ground instantly.

Ceasefire time

During the Russian ceasefire, the Dudayev elements secretly mobilized a large number of troops to the Grozny area. On May 14, 1995, they began to use mortars and missiles Throttle artillery bombarded the Chechen capital occupied by Russian troops indiscriminately in an attempt to recapture Grozny. The Russian army immediately launched a counterattack. On the 15th, federal troops, with aviation fire support, defeated the invading militants.

Special forces broke in

On May 15, 1995, the Russian army advanced deep into the Chechen mountains and launched a large-scale offensive in an attempt to completely defeat the militants. Fierce battles broke out between Russian troops and car bandits in the Shatoy, Vydensk, Shali, Orekhovo, Serzhen-Yurt, and Nozai-Yurt regions. Chechen militants took advantage of the mountains to resist stubbornly and tried every means to stop the Russian offensive. In order to support the offensive of ground troops in the Chatoy area, the Russian aviation force used helicopters for the first time to airdrop special forces units behind enemy lines.

The war escalated

In late May 1995, the Russian aviation force launched a larger-scale combat operation in Chechnya. Su-25 attack aircraft, Mi-24 helicopters, and internal defense force Mi -8MT helicopters carried out violent air strikes on the deployment positions and support points of the militants, destroying the armored equipment, ammunition warehouses and command posts of the bandits. The Su-24M bombers used a large number of high-precision weapons such as KAB-500L and KAB-500KR lasers and TV-guided bombs to carry out precise strikes against car bandits. On May 21, 1995, a Su-24M bomber launched a KAB-500KR guided missile southwest of the village of Dagu-Borzoi, destroying a building occupied by a group of militants. On May 24, 1995, a Su-24M bomber launched two KAB-500L guided missiles at an altitude of 4000-5000 meters and a flight speed of 800-900 kilometers per hour, directly hitting the target and destroying the southern part of Zonei Village. The secret ammunition depot of the car bandits in a cave was completely destroyed.

The new role of the Army Aviation Corps

During this period, the Army Aviation Corps helicopter pilots completed 5-6 combat missions every day. This kind of combat intensity was unprecedented for Russian pilots in any military conflict after World War II. Unexperienced. In addition to providing fire support to ground offensive forces, Army aviation helicopters also actively participated in combat missions aimed at destroying the Dudayev terrorist and subversive activity teams that had penetrated into the rear of the Russian army. On May 24, 1995, during such an operation , a Mi-24 helicopter was shot down near the town of Aura in Chechnya, and one pilot died on the spot.

Siege

After the militants retreated to the mountains of southern Chechnya, they built a command post in the village of Vegeno. The Russian aviation force’s precise attack on the headquarters of the car bandits in Vegeno village was shocking. Called a classic. On May 28, 1995, a Russian Air Force Su-24 bomber launched a KAB-500 guided missile, which accurately hit the left wing of the car bandit headquarters building. At 12:00 on May 31, 1995, two Su-24 bombers carried out another air strike. The first aerial bomb completely destroyed the club building 70 meters away from the headquarters building, where the Dudayev elements installed a high-power radio station, the second bomb leveled the headquarters building to the ground. Two other precision strikes destroyed the car bandits' special office and security office buildings in the village respectively. On May 31, 1995, Russian Su-25 attack aircraft also conducted intensive bombings on vehicle bandit positions in the Argonne and Vydensk Gorges.

On June 1-2, 1995, Russian army troops surrounded the village of Vegeno from two directions. The airborne troops used Mi-8 helicopters to suddenly land behind the village to cut off the retreat of the car bandits. On June 3, 1995, the Russian army captured the last strategic stronghold of the car bandits. After the Battle of Vegeno, the car bandits lost their headquarters and the last heavy armored equipment. The unified command system was broken, and the illegal armed forces were divided into the Chatoy and Nozai-Yurt areas.

On June 4, 1995, during the attack on Nozai-Yurt, another Russian Mi-24 helicopter was shot down. The pilots, Captain Karpov and Lieutenant Khokhlachev, sacrifice.

On June 9, 1995, militants shot down another Mi-8 transport helicopter, killing Major Malikov and Captain Sergelov.

Results of the war

In the early summer of 1995, the main battles of the first Chechen War were coming to an end. Dudayev's army, which lost its unified command, was disintegrated and gradually turned into various gangs fighting alone. They were unable to coordinate their actions. Some militants began to voluntarily surrender their weapons. The car bandits only controlled the last of the 12 mountainous centers of Chechnya. One: Chatoy.

On June 11, 1995, Russian federal forces began to attack Chatoy. In order to cooperate with the offensive of ground troops, Mi-8 transport helicopters, under the cover of Mi-24 armed helicopters, dropped tactical airborne troops behind enemy lines. On June 12, 1995, a Mi-8 helicopter transporting weapons and ammunition for the airborne troops was attacked by a ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun carefully disguised by car bandits. The helicopter caught fire in the air. The pilot miraculously drove the helicopter to make an emergency landing safely and landed safely. The helicopter ran out of the dangerous area before the explosion. This Mi-8 helicopter also became the last helicopter lost by the Army Aviation Corps during the first Chechen War.

On the evening of June 13, 1995, the Russian motorized infantry and airborne regiments descending from the sky surrounded Chatoy and launched a charge. The panicked bandits realized that resistance was pointless and took advantage of the darkness of night. Mountain road evacuation. On June 14, 1995, the Russian army captured Chatoy and the Russian flag was raised high. At this point, the active fighting in the first Chechen War was basically over. After that, the Russian army did not launch any large-scale wars. However, the battle to hunt down the remnants of Dudayev's army scattered in the mountainous areas and disarm the car bandits continued for another year. , on June 28, 1996, President Yeltsin flew to Chechnya and announced that the war was over and victory belonged to Russia.

Historical Impact

After the end of the first Chechen War, Chechen militants changed their operational strategies, adopted guerrilla tactics, planned terrorist attacks, waited for opportunities to make a comeback, and started a cat-and-mouse battle with the Russian army. The North Caucasus has since entered a state of neither war nor peace before the second Chechen War.